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ABSTRACT
In recent decades, a new integration-demarcation cleavage has emerged in
Europe, pitting political parties in favour of globalisation against those oppos-
ing globalisation. Although a lot is known about the socio-structural basis
and the political organisation of this cleavage, we do not know the extent to
which these political divides have led to social divides. Therefore, this article
investigates how losers and winners of globalisation oppose each other. On
the basis of representative online experiments in Germany and Austria, this
article studies attitudes and behaviour towards people with different national-
ities, education, and party preferences, which correspond to the cultural,
socio-structural, and organisational elements of the new cleavage. More par-
ticularly, the extent to which people are willing to interact with each other in
daily life and how much they trust each other is investigated. The main
results show that people who identify with different parties (especially if they
belong to the other side of the cleavage) oppose each other much more
strongly than people with different nationalities. There is no divide, however,
between the low-skilled and high-skilled. Finally, it appears that the social
divides are asymmetrical: the winners of globalisation resent the losers more
than the other way round.
KEYWORDS Cleavages; globalisation; populism; affective; polarisation
The rise of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe over the last
decades has led to fierce political debate over issues of denationalisation
and the question of whether or not national borders should be opened or
closed, and whether or not globalisation brings more advantages than dis-
advantages. As Kriesi et al. have shown, globalisation has changed the
political structure in Western Europe and has led to the emergence of the
new integration-demarcation cleavage, which pits those who profit from
globalisation against those who do not (Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012).
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Although we already know a lot about the existence of this cleavage at
the political level and on how parties position themselves around it, we
do not know to what extent these political divides also exist as social
divides between the (real or potential) winners and losers of globalisation.
Having different political convictions does not necessarily mean that vot-
ers of different parties dislike each other. Or could it be that right-wing
populist voters prefer not to interact with voters of parties in favour of
more open borders in their daily life and vice versa?
The existence of such social tensions would tell us something about
the salience of this cleavage. If people not only disagree with others on
their political views but also do not want to have them in their neigh-
bourhood or among their friends, we can speak of a particularly strongly
embedded cleavage. The main goal of this article is thus to find out
whether such social divides exist and how strong they are, resulting in a
more comprehensive understanding of the new political cleavage.
Following the literature in this field, we define losers of globalisation as
those who see their opportunities in life diminished as a result of global-
isation. Often, this group are characterised as being less educated, oppos-
ing migration and supporting populist parties. In contrast, winners of
globalisation are those who see their life chances improved through glo-
balisation. Usually, these individuals are found among the more highly
educated; they tend to be in favour of migration; and they support non-
populist parties (e.g. Azmanova 2011; Hobolt 2016; Rooduijn 2015;
Steenvoorden and Harteveld 2018; Teney et al. 2014). Accordingly, in our
analyses we investigate how populist/non-populist voters, poorly/highly-
educated people, and natives/immigrants position themselves towards
each other.
In contrast to the infinite number of studies that for several decades
have investigated prejudice against immigrants (Hainmueller and Hopkins
2014), social divides and more particularly tensions between members of
different parties or different educational groups have hardly been studied
so far, not even outside the cleavage literature. Kuppens et al. (2018) were
the first to provide a systematic analysis of whether and why people
evaluate education-based in-groups and out-groups differently. Most
research on partisan polarisation investigated attitudes towards different
political parties or their candidates in the United States (Levendusky
2018; Mason 2015; Rogowski and Sutherland 2016; Webster and
Abramowitz 2017). Research on polarisation between voters of different
parties is fairly recent, showing that it exceeds discrimination against
members of religious, linguistic, racial, ethnic, or regional out-groups
(Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Mason 2018; Westwood et al. 2018). In a
related field, it has been shown that people with liberal and conservative
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attitudes oppose each other to the same degree (Brandt et al. 2014;
Chambers et al. 2013; Crawford et al. 2017). None of these studies, how-
ever, was concerned with political cleavages, because their focus was on
specific political or social conflicts between partisan, value-based or edu-
cational groups. Although we do adopt some of the individual arguments
discussed in these studies and some of their methodologies, we go beyond
them by aiming to make a contribution to the cleavage literature and by
looking at partisan, national and educational groups together.
We expect the divide between voters of parties on the two sides of the inte-
gration-demarcation cleavage to be relatively large—at least as large as that
between natives and immigrants—because people are mobilised by political
rhetoric consisting to a large extent of hostilities directed at opposing parties.
Contrary to other minority traits, there are no social norms that prevent peo-
ple from expressing negative views towards voters of other parties or people
with a different education (Iyengar and Westwood 2015: 690; Kuppens et al.
2018: 431). Both education and party choice are seen by many as personal
choices that may be criticised and opposed.
We also explore the extent to which these divides are asymmetrical in
nature. It may be argued that the losers of globalisation dislike the win-
ners much more than the other way round, given that right-wing popu-
lists appear as the driving force in current controversies. At the same
time, the highly educated winners of globalisation are often seen as being
generally tolerant towards minorities. It may also be argued, however,
that the winners strongly oppose the losers, because they see their
achievements put in danger, especially in the absence of social norms that
would prevent them from showing prejudice against out-groups.
In order to test our arguments, we conducted representative online
surveys in Germany and Austria in which we included vignette experi-
ments and trust games to measure attitudes and behaviour towards other
groups. We show that people who vote for different parties (especially if
they belong to the other side of the cleavage) oppose each other much
more strongly than people of different nationalities. There is no divide,
however, between the low-skilled and high-skilled. Finally, it appears that
the social divides are asymmetrical in nature, with the winners of global-
isation resenting the losers more than the other way round. The general
patterns are the same in Germany and Austria. We find that polarisation
is bigger in Germany, however. We conclude by discussing possible rea-
sons for this difference.
Cleavage in-group bias and social distance
Modern societies are characterised by widespread and permanent
‘cleavages’, a specific structure of political conflict that profoundly shapes
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their political systems (Bartolini 2005; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Fully
developed cleavages, according to Bartolini and Mair (1990: 213–20),
should include three elements: a distinct socio-structural basis such as
class or religion, a collective identity, and a particular form of political
organisation of this group. In other words, a cleavage is more than just a
cluster of social groups with diverging interests. These groups need to be
aware of their common interests and develop some form of group con-
sciousness or collective identity. Moreover, some organisational structure
is necessary to articulate these interests.
Whereas traditional cleavages of class and religion have declined in
importance (Franklin et al. 1992), a new integration-demarcation cleavage
has been shown to have emerged in Western societies over the last deca-
des, one driven by economic, cultural and political globalisation (Kriesi
et al. 2008, 2012). Increasing transnational economic competition has led
to economic risks and feelings of insecurity. Immigration and increasing
cultural diversity are often perceived as a threat to one’s national culture.
Finally, European integration is regarded by some as a threat to national
sovereignty. These processes affect some citizens more than others, or
they are perceived differently by different groups, thereby creating a latent
structural potential of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalisation, that is, people
who benefit from these processes and those who do not.
Education and social class constitute the crucial socio-structural basis
of winners and losers of globalisation, and populist and non-populist par-
ties are the main political actors articulating their respective interests
(Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012). Highly educated people and socio-cultural spe-
cialists are more in favour of cultural integration than less-educated peo-
ple and unskilled workers. Bovens and Wille (2017: 51–2) show that
educational differences correlate with cosmopolitan and nationalist atti-
tudes. Stubager (2009, 2010) argues that education explains authoritarian
and libertarian values in the same way as social class used to explained
socialist left and conservative right positions. For these reasons, it has
been argued that the educational revolution in the 1960s and 1970s has
led to a new cleavage. Stubager (2010) even speaks of an education cleav-
age. Right-wing populist parties rely much more on low- and medium-
educated than highly educated people (Arzheimer 2009). At the other end
of the political spectrum, green and social-democratic parties mostly
attract highly educated voters (Bovens and Wille 2017: 53–4). These are
the parties that most strongly represent the two sides of the new integra-
tion-demarcation cleavage.
Most of the existing literature emphasises the socio-structural and the
organisational components of the cleavage. Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012), for
example, analyse the demand and supply side of the new cleavage, looking
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at how voters and political parties position themselves towards crucial
political issues that make up the integration-demarcation cleavage. The
extent to which group consciousness or collective identity exist around
this cleavage and how it affects the perceptions of in- and out-groups and
interactions between these groups has yet to be shown, however. Thus,
there is still little evidence as to what extent the new cleavage is also
socially embedded.
We follow social identity group scholars who argue that under the con-
dition of group competition (such as conflicts over globalisation issues),
collective identities should lead to the ascription of undesirable traits to
persons that do not belong to the in-group (Tajfel 1970; Tajfel and
Turner 1979). This can also be called in-group bias. For if cleavage identi-
ties do exist, we should observe that in the process of creating in- and
out-groups, they lead to positive views of the self and negative views of
the other side of the cleavage (H1a). Such favouritism is not simply based
on values, or in our case policy positions, but more generally on a sense
of inclusion or exclusion (Brewer 2001). In such situations, people are
opposed to close interpersonal relationships with out-group members.
Accordingly, and accounting for the degrees of social distance (Bogardus
1925), we expect different degrees of acceptability that depend on social
distance: attitudes towards out-groups become more negative the closer
these groups come to the in-group in social terms (H1b).
If a social divide can be expected between winners and losers of global-
isation, the question is how strong is it? We expect winners and losers to
express more negative attitudes towards the respective out-groups than
natives express towards immigrants—one of the most researched social
divides—because there are no social norms that prevent people from
expressing negative views towards voters of other parties or people with a
different level of education (H2) (Iyengar and Westwood 2015: 690;
Kuppens et al. 2018: 431). This stands in stark contrast to constraints that
exist regarding ethnicity, religion, gender, disability, sexuality and age.
Discrimination based on these characteristics is forbidden by German
anti-discrimination law, for example. Chambers et al. (2013) show that
prejudice towards ethnic minorities increases even among liberals if these
minorities are described as particularly conservative. It thus appears that
supposedly tolerant people have no difficulty expressing negative attitudes
if the minorities’ political convictions are emphasised.
The absence of such norms in the political context can also be
explained by the mobilising political rhetoric that consists, to a large
extent, of hostilities directed at opposing parties (Iyengar and Westwood
2015: 690). In the light of these everyday struggles among political parties,
it seems to be completely acceptable for ordinary voters to express
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negative attitudes towards partisan out-groups. In fact, negative party
identification has had a major impact on political outcomes across the
western world (Medeiros and No€el 2014), as quite often people define
themselves not by who they are but rather by who they are not (Zhong
et al. 2008). Not only are such negative evaluations more influential than
positive ones (Baumeister et al. 2001), they also show different causes and
effects (Cacioppo and Berntson 1994).
With respect to education, Kuppens et al. (2018: 429) argue in a simi-
lar vein that ‘attitudes to those with few educational qualifications have
become one of the last bastions of ‘acceptable’ prejudice [… ]’. They go
on to say that these negative attitudes might not even be perceived as
prejudice, showing in various experiments that the highly educated are
perceived (by both highly and less-educated people) as being superior.
One reason is that education is seen as the responsibility of the individ-
ual. In other words, under a neoliberal perception, a person’s level of edu-
cation is as much seen as being a matter of personal choice as voting for
a political party—accordingly, criticising or opposing such choices is not
considered discriminatory behaviour.
Symmetrical or asymmetrical social divides?
Besides the question to which extent such social divides exist, we have
also tried to discover whether or not they are symmetrical. Do losers and
winners of globalisation dislike each other in equal measure? Two com-
peting arguments are tested. On the one hand, it may be argued that it is
mainly the losers of globalisation who create these tensions, meaning they
oppose the winners of globalisation more than the other way round
(H3a). After all, the rise of right-wing populist parties can first and fore-
most be seen as opposition to globalisation. Accordingly, the voters of
populist right-wing parties oppose those voters they think are responsible
for, or benefit from, open borders. As education can be seen as a status
marker in modern societies (Spruyt 2014) or as symbolic capital indicat-
ing competence and respectability (Bourdieu 1979/1984), the highly edu-
cated are also perceived more generally as part of the elite and hence
serve as the main opponents of right-wing populist parties and voters
(Mudde 2007). Populist voters may also think of themselves as a group
dominated by the cosmopolitan elite, or they feel frustration because they
cannot profit from the advantages of globalisation, hence finding them-
selves in a position where they want to change the power relationship
(Stubager 2009: 226).
The losers’ stronger opposition towards the winners of globalisation
might also be owing to the fact that as members of the dominant group,
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the highly educated might not even be aware of the conflict between the
two groups, being ‘entirely embedded within their own perspective’
(Stubager 2009: 226). At the same time, the winners of globalisation pos-
sess characteristics that are normally related to tolerance towards out-
groups. A large number of studies has already shown that cosmopolitans
and highly educated people are more tolerant, especially when it comes to
immigrants and ethnic minorities (Flanagan and Lee 2003; Hagendoorn
and Nekuee 1999; Heyder 2003; Vogt 1997; Wagner and Zick 1995). It
has been shown that there is generally more intergroup bias among low-
status groups than among high-status groups (Mullen et al. 1992). One
explanation is offered by social identity theory, which says that low-status
groups have to work harder to create a positive identity for themselves
(Tajfel and Turner 1979).
On the other hand, it may also be argued that the losers of globalisa-
tion are less opposed towards the winners than vice versa (H3b).
Although more highly educated people have often been shown to be less
prejudiced towards other groups, we know surprisingly little about the
mechanisms behind this effect. Hello et al. (2006) and Halperin et al.
(2007) found that open-mindedness and cognitive sophistication hardly
play a role. Rather, it is the absence of a perceived threat that leads to
more tolerant attitudes. This explains why highly skilled people do not
oppose immigrants, who are more often low skilled and do not compete
with them in the job market. The losers of globalisation, however, may
indeed be perceived as a threat by the winners of globalisation—mostly
for cultural reasons, as the losers of globalisation challenge the winners’
cosmopolitan attitudes. Even ethnic minorities may be perceived as a
threat if they do not share the winners’ cosmopolitan values (Brandt et al.
2014). Material reasons may also play a role, because the winners of glo-
balisation may fear losing the privileges they gained through the process
of globalisation. It seems plausible, therefore, that the tolerance of the
highly educated is merely an ideological discourse to mask their self-inter-
ests (Jackman and Crane 1986; Jackman and Muha 1984). This disguise
may easily disappear in a context where voicing prejudice towards an
out-group is less restricted, if at all, by social control, as argued above.
Along the same lines, relative gratification theory assumes that favour-
able in-group comparison also leads to increased prejudice (Dambrun
et al. 2006; Guimond and Dambrun 2002). Considered the inverse of rela-
tive deprivation (LeBlanc et al. 2015), favourable in-group comparison
describes a certain privilege awareness (Kawakami and Dion 1995;
McIntosh 2012) that leads people to develop stereotypes against out-
groups and ethnic minorities in particular (Guimond and Dambrun
2002). Most likely, individuals with higher social or economic status tend
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to stigmatise low-status groups in order to justify inequality and their cur-
rent privileges (Crocker et al. 1998), which is in line with social domin-
ance theory (Sidanius and Pratto 1999) and system justification theory
(Jost and Banaji 1994). Prejudice is considered an insurance policy that
helps to support group-based hierarchy and in-group hegemony (LeBlanc
et al. 2015). In addition, oppression of those with low status can serve
simultaneously to benefit the group (i.e. by maintaining the status quo)
and the individual (i.e. their within-group status, trust, and influence).
Thus, privileged individuals might act strategically to secure specific
objectives within their own group, too (Postmes and Smith 2009). This
asymmetric relationship might be amplified by the fact that even the
lower-educated see their lack of education as an undesirable trait.
Kuppens et al. (2018) have shown that lower-educated people judged their
own group to be more responsible for their disadvantaged situation.
In sum, the literature suggests that if social divides between winners
and losers of globalisation do exist, they are very unlikely to be symmet-
rical. The extent to which this relationship is in fact asymmetrical, and
which cleavage group holds more negative attitudes towards the other
group, is an empirical question that will be analysed in the follow-
ing sections.
Data
Two representative surveys from an online panel executed by the survey
firm respondi were fielded in Germany in October 2017 (N¼ 1229) and
in Austria in July and August 2018 (N¼ 1094).1 Online surveys allow par-
ticipants to read short vignettes, which we use for our experiments (see
below), and are now considered a standard tool in the social sciences,
with data quality being comparable to more traditional survey modes
(Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2014; Yeager et al. 2011). Comparing
Germany and Austria allows us to generalise our findings. Both countries
are very similar in economic and institutional terms and have known
extensive mobilisation from the populist right. The two countries can
therefore be seen as most likely cases regarding the emergence of the
social divides discussed above.
Unfortunately, it is not possible directly to measure cleavage conscious-
ness or collective identities, because survey participants would struggle to
answer questions regarding the extent to which they identify with winners
or losers of globalisation. Following a large number of studies in this field,
we therefore operationalise winners and losers of globalisation on the
basis of party choices, attitudes towards immigrants and level of educa-
tion, which correspond to the organisational, cultural and socio-structural
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elements of the new cleavage. (e.g. Azmanova 2011; Hobolt 2016;
Rooduijn 2015; Steenvoorden and Harteveld 2018; Teney et al. 2014).
Kriesi (2012) shows that it is mainly the parties from the populist right
and to some extent also those from the populist left that mobilise losers
of globalisation and are thereby the driving forces behind the emergence
of the new cleavage, especially around the topics of immigration and
European integration. Most other parties on both the moderate left and
right support the lowering of national boundaries.2 Dolezal and Hutter
(2012) conclude that besides social class, it is education in particular that
allows us to distinguish winners from losers of globalisation.
In investigating the strength of these cleavage identities, we follow the
literature on affective polarisation (e.g. Iyengar and Westwood 2015),
which looks at the consequences of collective identities in a competitive
setting, namely how much one group opposes another group and thus
how strongly people’s attitudes or behaviour towards their own cleavage
group and towards the opposing cleavage group differ. In other words,
we seek to find out how a person’s attitudes and behaviour change when
they are confronted with someone who shares the same characteristics in
terms of party preferences, nationality and education, as opposed to a
person who does not share them.
We conducted both attitudinal and behavioural vignette survey experi-
ments (see Table A1 in the Online appendix for descriptive statistics and
Table A2 for question wording). For the attitudinal dimension of social
distance, respondents received one vignette and were presented with per-
sons who either had one of three nationalities (German/Austrian, Italian
or Turkish) or were members of national political parties. Turks consti-
tute the largest immigration group in Germany and the third largest in
Austria (after Germans and Serbians). In both countries, Italians are
among the most important immigration group from Western Europe, and
the two groups have led to fierce political debates in the post-WWII
period (Italians) and over the last three decades (Turks). Accounting for
these two immigrant groups allows us to differentiate between one group
that is culturally closer and considered as relatively well integrated
(Italians) and one that is culturally more distant and often portrayed as
relatively poorly integrated (Turks).
Regarding partisanship, we differentiate between the two most relevant
left-wing and right-wing populist parties in Germany, The Left and the
Alternative for Germany (AfD), and the two most important moderate
left- and right-wing parties, the Social Democratic Party of Germany
(SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU).3 We
regard both the SPD and the CDU as parties that represent the winners
of globalisation. Until the 2000s, the CDU positioned itself on the
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exclusionist side of the cleavage, especially in terms of culture (Dolezal
2008b: 226–31). It belonged to the group of parties with culturally protec-
tionist and nationalist positions similar to newly emerged right-wing
populist parties and transformed mainstream parties such as the Dutch
VVD or the UK Conservatives (Kriesi 2012: 102). Although the AfD
failed to enter the national parliament in the 2013 elections, it clearly
positioned itself as the dominant nationalist and anti-immigrant party. At
the same time, the CDU moved to a more centrist inclusionist position,
which is relatively close culturally to that of the SPD (Bremer and
Schulte-Cloos 2019).
In Austria, we differentiate between the major right-wing populist
Freedom Party of Austria (FP€O) and the two major moderate parties: the
Social Democratic Party of Austria (SP€O) and the Austrian People’s Party
(€OVP). In the absence of an important left-wing populist party in
Austria, we included the Green Party in order to also have four parties in
Austria to make the survey designs as similar as possible in the two coun-
tries. Since the transformation of the FP€O in the late 1980s, Austria has
known one of the first and most successful right-wing populist parties in
Europe (Mudde 2007: 42). Since the 1999 elections, which led to a coali-
tion between €OVP and FP€O and subsequent EU sanctions, Austria has
seen a highly polarised configuration between the government parties on
the one side and SP€O and Greens on the other (Dolezal 2008a: 126–27).
In the 2000s, however, the €OVP became much more culturally liberal
than the FP€O, similar to some European liberal parties (Kriesi et al.
2012: 102).
We did not combine nationality and partisanship, because some com-
binations would have been rather unrealistic (e.g. Turkish AfD partisans).
In all seven categories, however, we differentiated between people of dif-
ferent nationalities or partisanship as having either a university degree or
a high school degree. High school degree refers to the German
Hauptschule, the lowest secondary school in Germany and Austria. We
specifically chose this school type because its negative image heavily
polarises public debate. In sum, we thus distinguished between 14 ran-
domly assigned groups. Tables A3a–A4c in the Online appendix provide
balance cheques and display the distribution of relevant socio-economic
characteristic across all 14 treatment groups.
Each survey respondent received one vignette and was asked on a
seven-point scale whether it would cause a problem, for example, if a per-
son with a university degree and Turkish citizenship moved into their
neighbourhood, if they had to work with that person, if that person was
among their close friends, or if someone from their immediate family
would marry that person. The order of these four situations was
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randomised. These questions allow us not only to compare attitudes
towards in- and out-groups but also to see whether attitudes towards out-
groups become more negative the closer this group comes to the respond-
ent (Bogardus 1925).
In order to test the robustness of our findings and to see how in-group
bias also leads to discriminatory behaviour, we ran a second experiment with
vignettes similar to the ones used in the attitudinal setting (see Table A2 in
the Online appendix for detailed instructions and question wording for this
experiment). This time, however, respondents played a trust game, in which
they were assigned a fictitious amount of 10 euros. They were then allowed
to divide the sum between themselves (player 1) and a hypothetical player
2 (vignette). The amount given to player 2 would be tripled, and player 2
would decide how much money to give to player 1. Player 1 would keep
the sum from the first round plus whatever player 2 would potentially
assign him in the second round. Respondents were told that higher rewards
would indicate greater success in the game.4 As in the previous case, player
2 was randomly assigned 1 of 14 different combinations of nationality, par-
tisanship and education. The entire game was played twice, meaning that
each respondent received two vignettes. In the second round, it was assured
that respondents played the game against an opponent with a different
combination of characteristics. Contrary to rationality expectations and des-
pite the fact that they play with a relatively small amount of money, behav-
ioural economists have shown that survey participants allocate non-trivial
amounts, depending on the characteristics of the respondents and those of
their fictitious partners (Fershtman and Gneezy 2001; Wilson and
Eckel 2011).
To test our arguments, we calculated the average positions in the first
(attitudinal) experiment by means of OLS regression analyses. We ran lin-
ear regressions for each treatment combination, separately including only
a dependent variable but no predictors. We then plotted the constant (i.e.
the mean of each treatment group) with 95% confidence intervals (see
Jann 2014). As participants provided answers to two vignettes in the
second (behavioural) experiment, we constructed a stacked data file that
includes two cases for each respondent. For this reason, we ran multilevel
analyses to predict the amount of money someone gives to the other
player by taking into account the nested structure of the data (participants
are the upper level and the vignettes the lower level). Again, we ran sep-
arate models for each treatment group that contained only the dependent
variable and plotted the mean of each treatment group with 95% confi-
dence intervals. The detailed regression analyses can be found in the
Online appendix (Tables A5–A8). All scales were recoded so that higher
values indicate more positive attitudes.
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Analyses
In the first step of our analyses in Figures 1 and 2, we have tried to
discover how people position themselves towards others who have either
the same or a different nationality, education or party identity (see
also Online appendix, Tables A5a and A5b).5 We look at the national
out-groups, Italians and Turks, which represent culturally more close and
distant immigration groups and are considered better and rather poorly
integrated in Germany. Regarding partisan out-groups, we look at
people’s attitudes towards members of a different party or members of a
party at the other cleavage side. This last differentiation pits AfD voters
against all other voters and vice versa. For each category, we show separ-
ately whether people see it as a problem if these other people moved into
their neighbourhood (grey) or if a close family member married someone
from these groups (black). For the sake of clarity, we do not display the
results for the two items work and friendship. More detailed analyses
have shown that in most instances the items neighbourhood and marriage
constitute the two extreme values, as would be expected by social dis-
tance theory.
We found confirmation for our hypothesis 1, according to which
in-groups are seen more positively than out-groups.6 This finding, how-
ever, depends very much on how the in- and out-groups are defined.
National and partisan in-groups are seen more positively than educational
Same nationality
Different nationality Italian
Different nationality Turks
Same education
Different education
Same party
Different party
Different cleavage
4 5 6 7
Figure 1. Attitudes towards in- and out-groups in Germany.
Note: Average scores on a scale from 1 (negative) to 7 (positive) and 95% confidence intervals are
reported. The results are based on the regression models documented in Online appendix Table A5a.
Grey dots indicate neighbourhood, black dots marriage. ‘Different cleavage’ indicates attitudes
between AfD and all other voters.
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in-groups. There is hardly any difference in attitudes if the out-group is a
culturally relatively close and well-integrated group, like the Italians, or if
they have a different level of education. For reference, the average sym-
pathy ranges from 6.45 (Germany: marriage, CI: 6.29; 6.61) to 6.76
(Austria: neighbourhood, CI: 6.64; 6.88) on a scale from 1 to 7 for the
national in-group in both countries and almost the same for Italians
(Germany: marriage, 6.34 [CI: 6.12; 6.56] to Austria: neighbourhood, 6.62
[CI: 6.46; 6.76]). Out-groups are strongly resented, however, if they are a
culturally distant immigrant group, like the Turks, and if they identify
with a different party, especially if this party belongs to the other side of
the integration-demarcation cleavage. For instance, people’s approval of
someone close marrying a person with Turkish background drops by
around one point in Germany (to 5.26, CI: 4.97; 5.55) and by almost
two points in Austria (to 4.93, CI: 4.58; 5.28) compared to that person
marrying a native or Italian. And quite similarly, people affiliated with a
party from the other side of the cleavage are rated about one point lower
in Austria (5.40, CI: 5.13; 5.67) and about two points lower in Germany
(4.37, CI: 4.08; 4.66) as compared to people with the same nationality (i.e.
the reference group).
The pattern regarding attitudes towards partisan out-groups confirms
our hypothesis 2. Winners and losers of globalisation express particularly
strong negative attitudes towards each other in Germany. These tensions
Same nationality
Different nationality Italian
Different nationality Turks
Same education
Different education
Same party
Different party
Different cleavage
4 5 6 7
Figure 2. Attitudes towards in- and out-groups in Austria.
Note: Average scores on a scale from 1 (negative) to 7 (positive) and 95% confidence intervals are
reported. The results are based on the regression models documented in Online appendix Table A5b.
Gray dots indicate neighbourhood, black dots marriage. ‘Different cleavage’ indicates attitudes
between FP€O and all other voters.
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are even bigger than those towards immigrants, especially if one compares
them with attitudes towards Italian immigrants. But we see increased
resentment even in comparison with attitudes towards Turkish immi-
grants.7 Attitudes towards partisan in-groups (6.67, CI: 6.49; 6.85) are
even slightly more positive than towards the national in-group (6.45, CI:
6.29; 6.61), and there are clearly more negative attitudes towards cleavage
out-groups (4.37, CI: 4.08; 4.66) than towards Turkish immigrants (5.26,
CI: 4.97; 5.55). In Austria, the pattern is similar but less polarising for
partisans. Here, fellow partisans (6.77, CI: 6.65; 6.89) are again rated in
more sympathetic terms than the national in-group (6.71, CI: 6.59; 6.83),
but those from the other side of the cleavage (5.40, CI: 5.13; 5.67) are not
rated lower than Turkish immigrants (4.93, CI: 4.58; 5.28). Concerning
educational out-groups, our hypotheses 1 and 2 are only partly confirmed.
We see that attitudes are more negative towards educational out-groups
(AT: 6.01 [CI: 5.89; 6.13], DE: 5.69 [CI: 5.53; 5.85]) than towards Italian
immigrants (AT: 6.46 [CI: 6.28; 6.64], DE: 6.34 [CI: 6.12; 6.56]) but simi-
lar and partly more positive in comparison to attitudes towards Turkish
immigrants (AT: 4.93 [CI: 4.58; 5.28], DE: 5.26 [CI: 4.97; 5.55]). People,
however, make no difference between educational in- and out-groups.
We also see the social distance argument confirmed, with average sym-
pathy across treatment groups being about 0.3 to 0.6 points lower
when considering a person supposed to marry someone close to oneself
as compared to someone moving into the respondent’s neighbourhood.
Especially for highly resented groups like Turkish immigrants and
partisan out-groups, we see that attitudes get even more negative when
people are asked how they would react if close family members married
someone from these groups (AT: 5.52 [CI: 5.23; 5.81] to 4.93 [CI: 4.58;
5.28], DE: 5.89 [CI: 5.64; 6.14] to 5.26 [CI: 4.97; 5.55]). As expected,
social distance does not play any role for national or partisan in-groups.
It is rather surprising, however, that such a difference exists for educa-
tional in-groups.
Figures 3 and 4 shows the results of our behavioural trust games and
allows us to see whether or not the behaviour towards opposing cleavage
groups corresponds to the attitudes we observed in Figures 1 and 2. The
scale goes from 0 (less generous) to 10 (more generous behaviour). In
Figures 3 and 4, we display the average values across both rounds (see
also Online appendix, Tables A6a and A6b). Overall, the behavioural
games led to the same results as the attitudinal vignette study. The differ-
ences are not as pronounced, however. Although the social distance
hypothesis cannot be tested here, we see with respect to partisan and
cleavage in- and out-groups that they lead to the strongest polarisation.
Again, the effect in Austria is somewhat weaker. Moreover, we find again
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that people make no differentiation between educational in- and out-
groups. Contrary to Figures 1 and 2, we see that more negative attitudes
towards Turks (compared to Germans/Austrians or Italians) do not trans-
late into actual discriminatory behaviour. This can also be seen as
Same nationality
Different nationality Italian
Different nationality Turks
Same education
Different education
Same party
Different party
Different cleavage
3 4 5 6
Figure 3. Behaviour towards in- and out-groups in Germany.
Note: Average scores on a scale from 0 to 10 euros and 95% confidence intervals are reported. The
results are based on the regression models documented in Online appendix Table A6a. ‘Different
cleavage’ indicates attitudes between AfD and all other voters.
 
Same nationality
Different nationality Italian
Different nationality Turks
Same education
Different education
Same party
Different party
Different cleavage
3 4 5 6
Figure 4. Behaviour towards in- and out-groups in Austria.
Note: Average scores on a scale from 0 to 10 euros and 95% confidence intervals are reported. The
results are based on the regression models documented in Online appendix Table A6b. ‘Different
cleavage’ indicates attitudes between FP€O and all other voters.
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confirmation of our hypothesis 2, namely that social desirability bias plays
a role for ethnic but not partisan groups. When different partisans are
addressed, people do not suppress their attitudes to keep a favourable
public image. Rather, they clearly discriminate against those supporting
opposing parties.
Having compared attitudes towards in- and out-groups across different
categories, we now try to discover how symmetrical these opposing atti-
tudes are. Could it be that one side of the cleavage resents the other more
strongly than the other way round, or are these attitudes completely
reciprocal? In Figure 5, we differentiate between attitudes among highly
and less-educated people, as well as between AfD, Linke, and majority
party (CDU, SPD) partisans, towards the respective out-groups (see also
Online appendix, Table A7a). For each category, we again show separately
whether people see it as a problem if these other persons moved
into their neighbourhood (grey) or if a close family member married
someone from these groups (black). Given that the sample only includes
natives, we do not investigate asymmetrical relationships between natives
and immigrants.
Concerning education, we see no difference for the neighbourhood
question. In Germany, the average level of sympathy of the higher edu-
cated with the lower educated and vice versa is about 6 points. In
Austria, the pattern is pretty much the same, with about 0.3 higher overall
agreement. We see, however, that more highly educated people have a
bigger problem with family members marrying a lower educated person
High towards Low Educated
Low towards High Educated
Major Parties towards AfD
AfD towards Major Parties
Major Parties towards Linke
Linke towards Major Parties
3 4 5 6 7
Figure 5. Asymmetrical relationships (attitudes) in Germany.
Note: Average scores on a scale from 1 (negative) to 7 (positive) and 95% confidence intervals are
reported. The results are based on the regression models documented in Online appendix Table A7a.
Gray dots indicate neighbourhood, black dots indicate marriage.
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than vice versa. We see a similar relationship between voters of the Left
and voters of majority parties. Whereas answers for the neighbourhood
question are very similar, majority party voters clearly have a bigger prob-
lem if close family members marry a voter of the Left than vice versa
(5.60 [CI: 5.31; 5.89] vs. 6.16 [CI: 5.73; 6.59]). An extremely asymmetrical
relationship can be observed between AfD and majority party identifiers.
Whereas AfD positions are similar to those between educational groups,
attitudes of majority party identifiers towards AfD partisans are by far the
most negative of all the different relationships we investigate (3.94 [CI:
3.57; 4.31] vs. 5.71 [CI: 5.18; 6.24]).8 We find similar asymmetrical effects
for Austria, even though the absolute degree of polarisation is slightly
weaker (5.11 [CI: 4.70; 5.52] vs. 5.94 [CI: 5.65; 6.23], see Figure 6 and
Online appendix, Table A7b). Finally, we found more or less similar but
weaker effects in the behaviour experiment (see Figures A1a and A1b and
Tables A8a and A8b in the Online appendix).
Overall, these findings confirm hypothesis 3b and disconfirm hypoth-
esis 3a, especially for party voters but partly also for education: losers of
globalisation are less opposed to the winners than vice versa. Highly edu-
cated people and the voters of majority parties are more opposed to less-
educated people and minority party voters than the other way round. We
also see the social distance argument reconfirmed: attitudes towards the
marriage question are more negative than attitudes towards the neigh-
bourhood question; this is particularly true for better educated and major-
ity party voters.
High towards Low Educated
Low towards High Educated
Major Parties towards FPÖ
FPÖ towards Major Parties
3 4 5 6 7
Figure 6. Asymmetrical relationships (attitudes) in Austria.
Note: Average scores on a scale from 1 (negative) to 7 (positive) and 95% confidence intervals are
reported. The results are based on the regression models documented in Online appendix Table A7b.
Gray dots indicate neighbourhood, black dots indicate marriage.
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Conclusion
This article set out to investigate the extent to which the new integration-
demarcation cleavage is socially embedded in the everyday life of ordinary
citizens. Although we already know a lot about the socio-economic basis
of the new cleavage and how it has been politically articulated, we do not
know to what extent it pits winners and losers of globalisation against
each other and thus constitutes not only a political but also a social div-
ide. Our study revealed the existence of a salient partisan in-group bias,
showing that people prefer having people in their neighbourhood and in
their family, who identify with the same party, and that they oppose espe-
cially those who identify with a party from the other side of the cleavage.
This in-group bias is as strong, if not stronger, than the ethnic in-group
favouritism that we took as a reference category. We did not find any in-
group favouritism, however, when it comes to education, which is a
crucial socio-economic characteristic of losers and winners of globalisa-
tion. Potentially, future studies could investigate this further in terms of
different perceptions of each group’s habitus (Bourdieu 1990).
Educational characteristics should thus not be varied in terms of objective
levels of education, but rather as different cultural manifestations on the
basis of certain lifestyles, language, attire or taste.
Winners and losers of globalisation do not only vote for different par-
ties that support or oppose denationalisation processes, they also try to
avoid each other in daily life. It seems that the hostile political rhetoric of
opposing parties left its imprint on ordinary citizens. It could be argued
(and tested in future studies) that prejudice against people from the other
side of the political cleavage is considered an acceptable attitude, unlike
prejudice against immigrants, which is inhibited by social and legal
norms, as argued by Iyengar and Westwood (2015: 690) and Kuppens
et al. (2018: 431).
Such an effect might also explain why, in the trust games, people’s
behaviour towards players from other parties is clearly more negative
than it is towards immigrants. The absence of social norms might also
explain the asymmetrical divide, because the winners of globalisation
(who are often more tolerant towards others who are considered out-
groups by some, such as immigrants or ethnic minorities) more strongly
oppose the losers of globalisation (who are often more prejudiced against
these out-groups) than vice versa. This is especially true for party voters
but partly also for people with different levels of education. We argued
that it seems plausible that winners of globalisation perceive the oppo-
nents of globalisation as a threat to their own cultural and economic
privileges and therefore prefer to maintain group-based hierarchy and in-
group hegemony.
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The fact that we observed the same patterns in a country where the
new integration-demarcation cleavage and a major right-wing populist
party emerged some time ago (Austria) and in a country where the cleav-
age and a right-wing populist party are much more recent phenomena
(Germany), allows us to make certain generalisations. Investigating only
two cases for a single period of time is an important limitation, however.
Data across time would be necessary to understand better how the emer-
gence of the cleavage affects the evolution of social divides. Investigating
contextual effects might help us better understand how the political divide
is translated into a social divide. Given the differences we observed in
Austria and Germany, it seems plausible that polarisation between partisans
begins to weaken once a newly established party becomes more familiar. In
other words, the stronger level of polarisation in Germany could be
explained by a positive bias to stigmatise AfD sympathisers in Germany.
However, polarisation does not disappear, even in a country that has
known one of the longest right-wing populist traditions in Europe.
Notes
1. The sample includes German and Austrian nationals above the age of 18 who
were sampled according to their gender, age and education. Respondi
maintains an ISO-certified Online Access Panel with around 100,000
potential respondents per country. For more information on the respondi
access panel, see https://www.respondi.com/. To control for speed and
slowness, we excluded the fastest and slowest three percent of respondents
from the dataset. This did not change our results in any way though. We also
checked whether the removal of the small number of respondents with a
migration background would alter our results. This was not the case in any
of the models reported.
2. It goes without saying that political parties also represent other social groups,
not just winners and losers of globalization, especially given the fact that the
political sphere also consists of other cleavages. Nonetheless, as we show
below, the parties included in this study represent the main political forces
on the two sides of the cleavage in the two countries under study.
3. For pragmatic reasons, and in order to have sufficiently large respondent
groups per treatment, we did not include other parties that might also have
been interesting in this context, such as the Greens or the pro-market Free
Democrats (FDP).
4. The players only used virtual money and were not rewarded with the
actual sum.
5. As Die Linke has traditionally been a political party from East Germany and
the AfD has been slightly more successful in East than in West Germany, we
also analyzed our data separately for both regions. It appeared that the
patterns we observe in our data are the same in West Germany. The overall
patterns are also very similar in East Germany, with a few exceptions that are
reported in the following sections.
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6. In general, we see that attitudes towards out-groups are also rather positive if
one takes into account the full scale. As we cannot compare these findings
with other studies, it is difficult to interpret the absolute levels. This is one of
the reasons why we are mostly interested in the relative differences and
compare attitudes towards different kinds of in- and out-groups.
7. In East Germany, attitudes towards Turks are more negative than in West
Germany. The attitudinal gap between partisan in- and outgroups is therefore
similar to the gap between national in- and outgroups.
8. This finding is mainly driven by voters in West Germany. Majority party
voters in East Germany have more positive attitudes towards AfD voters than
majority party voters in West Germany.
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